Antitrust Fines: Experiences from China

Antitrust fines are usually set for restitution and to dissuade potential offenders. The seriousness and duration of the offense usually determines the size of the fine imposed. Aggravating circumstances can also influence the size of the fine, while attenuating factors result in leniency. Economist...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Review of industrial organization 2020-08, Vol.57 (1), p.167-187
Main Authors: Jing, Ran, Gong, Jiong, Yi, Fang
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aggravating circumstances
Antitrust
Economics
Economics and Finance
Fines
Industrial Organization
Leniency
Microeconomics
Offenders
Reparations
Restitution
Seriousness
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Antitrust fines are usually set for restitution and to dissuade potential offenders. The seriousness and duration of the offense usually determines the size of the fine imposed. Aggravating circumstances can also influence the size of the fine, while attenuating factors result in leniency. Economists have developed the “optimal fine” theory as a guiding principle in setting antitrust fines. Using a sample of fines that were imposed on 76 companies in China, we find that actual fines are strongly correlated with what the optimal fine theory predicts, while the price overcharge ratio appears quite moderate: at only 4.9% on average.
ISSN:0889-938X
1573-7160
DOI:10.1007/s11151-019-09743-0