A Bayesian Game Based Vehicle-to-Vehicle Electricity Trading Scheme for Blockchain-Enabled Internet of Vehicles

With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on vehicular technology 2020-07, Vol.69 (7), p.6856-6868
Main Authors: Xia, Shengnan, Lin, Feilong, Chen, Zhongyu, Tang, Changbing, Ma, Yongjin, Yu, Xinghuo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bayes methods
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian game
Blockchain
Cryptography
Electric utilities
Electric vehicles
Electricity
electricity trading
Environmental protection
Game theory
Games
Internet of Vehicles
Power markets
Pricing
Shortages
Smart contracts
User satisfaction
vehicle-to-vehicle
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Summary:With ever increasing people's awareness of low carbon and environmental protection, electric vehicles are gradually gaining wide popularity. However, the driving endurance of the electric vehicle is the biggest shortage that hinders the fully acceptance of this new vehicle technology. To deal with this shortage, this paper proposed a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) electricity trading scheme based on Bayesian game pricing in blockchain-enabled Internet of vehicles (BIoV). Specifically, the Bayesian game is adopted for pricing in the distributed BIoV with incomplete information sharing. The optimal pricing under the linear strategic equilibrium has been obtained which maximizes the utilities of both sides of electricity transaction. The transaction volume is determined from the formulated convex problem that maximizes the social welfare. Then, the pricing game is implemented by the dedicated smart contract. Blockchain guarantees its trustworthiness, security, and reliability. Finally, the experimental results show that referring to the benchmark of static game with complete information, the proposed Bayesian game with incomplete information can achieve approximate satisfaction of users. The degree of approximation can reach to 98% when the pricing ranges of buyers and sellers are close. Moreover, the proposed scheme has great advantages over the static game with complete information in terms of communication overhead and timeliness in the decentralized IoVs.
ISSN:0018-9545
1939-9359
DOI:10.1109/TVT.2020.2990443