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Shapley and Scarf housing markets with consumption externalities
We introduce externalities into the classical model by Shapley and Scarf; that is, agents care about others and their preferences are defined over allocations rather than over single indivisible goods. After collecting some results about the nonexistence of several cooperative solutions, we focus on...
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Published in: | Journal of public economic theory 2020-09, Vol.22 (5), p.1481-1514 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | We introduce externalities into the classical model by Shapley and Scarf; that is, agents care about others and their preferences are defined over allocations rather than over single indivisible goods. After collecting some results about the nonexistence of several cooperative solutions, we focus on stable allocations and propose domains of preferences that can guarantee that they both exist and form a stable set Ă la von Neumann and Morgenstern. |
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ISSN: | 1097-3923 1467-9779 |
DOI: | 10.1111/jpet.12470 |