You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust

It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as 'moral disgust'. I offer an account of its constitutive features.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australasian journal of philosophy 2021-01, Vol.99 (1), p.19-33
Main Author: Fileva, Iskra
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
disgust
disgust-as-metaphor
Emotions
Metaphor
moral disgust
moral disgust scepticism
Morality
Philosophy
Skepticism
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Description
Summary:It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as 'moral disgust'. I offer an account of its constitutive features.
ISSN:0004-8402
1471-6828
DOI:10.1080/00048402.2020.1717560