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You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust
It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as 'moral disgust'. I offer an account of its constitutive features.
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| Published in: | Australasian journal of philosophy 2021-01, Vol.99 (1), p.19-33 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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| cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c338t-c8ed69bb920b9340af71a3d3b40384f3629d4daec41d375ca6324b94857fa40a3 |
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| cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c338t-c8ed69bb920b9340af71a3d3b40384f3629d4daec41d375ca6324b94857fa40a3 |
| container_end_page | 33 |
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 19 |
| container_title | Australasian journal of philosophy |
| container_volume | 99 |
| creator | Fileva, Iskra |
| description | It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. I maintain that sceptics are wrong: there is a distinct emotional response best described as 'moral disgust'. I offer an account of its constitutive features. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1080/00048402.2020.1717560 |
| format | article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0004-8402 |
| ispartof | Australasian journal of philosophy, 2021-01, Vol.99 (1), p.19-33 |
| issn | 0004-8402 1471-6828 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2487677457 |
| source | Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection |
| subjects | disgust disgust-as-metaphor Emotions Metaphor moral disgust moral disgust scepticism Morality Philosophy Skepticism |
| title | You Disgust Me. Or Do You? On the Very Idea of Moral Disgust |
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