Assembling land for urban revitalization in the presence of linchpin parcels and information asymmetries: An experimental investigation

This study uses economic experiments to determine if information asymmetries are likely to frustrate government efforts to assemble land for urban revitalization when there is a linchpin parcel that must be acquired to move a development project forward. Results suggest holdout behavior is more pron...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Land use policy 2020-12, Vol.99, p.104981, Article 104981
Main Authors: Zillante, Artie, Read, Dustin C., Seiler, Michael J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Assembling
Asymmetry
Development projects
Experiments
Holdout problems
Information asymmetries
Land
Land assembly
Land use
Landowners
Property
Urban regeneration
Urban revitalization
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Summary:This study uses economic experiments to determine if information asymmetries are likely to frustrate government efforts to assemble land for urban revitalization when there is a linchpin parcel that must be acquired to move a development project forward. Results suggest holdout behavior is more pronounced when landowners know a linchpin parcel exists. Surprisingly, landowners who know they control such parcels are found to be more willing to sell than those who are uncertain about the strategic importance of their properties. These observations raise interesting questions about the nature of holdout problems and how they can potentially be overcome by approaching land assembly in a transparent manner.
ISSN:0264-8377
1873-5754
DOI:10.1016/j.landusepol.2020.104981