Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) 2021-02, Vol.198 (S4), p.S909-S927
• Main Authors: de Prado Salas, Javier González, de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier, Bonilla, Jesús Zamora
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Abduction; Brandom, Robert; Cognition & reasoning; Education; Epistemology; Induction; Inference; Logic; Metaphysics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Probabilistic reasoning; Probability; Reasoning; S.I. : Inferentialism; Science; Scientific reasoning
• ISSN: 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1579-5

Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a practice-based characterization of scientific inference. We want to explore whether Brandom’s pragmatist–inferentialist framework can suitably accommodate several types of ampliative inference common in scientific reasoning and explanation (probabilistic reasoning, abduction and idealisation). First, we argue that Brandom’s view of induction in terms of merely permissive inferences is inadequate; in order to overcome the shortcoming of Brandom’s proposal, we put forward an alternative conception of inductive, probabilistic reasoning by appeal to the notion of degrees of commitment. Moreover, we examine the sorts of inferential commitments operative in other types of ampliative inferences, such as abduction or reasoning involving idealizations and assumptions. We suggest that agents engaging in these forms of reasoning often undertake restricted inferential commitments, whose scope and reach are more limited that in the case of the commitments associated with full beliefs.