Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal of game theory 2021-03, Vol.50 (1), p.105-118
Main Authors: Romero-Medina, Antonio, Triossi, Matteo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Assignment problem
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Markets
Matching
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Preferences
Responsiveness
Social and Behav. Sciences
Workers
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Summary:We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1