Partisan Fractures in U.S. Federalism’s COVID-19 Policy Responses

The comparatively poor U.S. response to COVID-19 was not due to federal inaction or a flawed federal system per se but to party polarization and presidential and gubernatorial preferences that frustrated federalism’s capacity to respond more effectively. The U.S. response is examined in terms of fou...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:State & local government review 2020-12, Vol.52 (4), p.298-308
Main Authors: Kincaid, John, Leckrone, J. Wesley
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cooperation
Coronaviruses
COVID-19
Federal government
Federalism
Nationalism
Partisanship
Polarization
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Summary:The comparatively poor U.S. response to COVID-19 was not due to federal inaction or a flawed federal system per se but to party polarization and presidential and gubernatorial preferences that frustrated federalism’s capacity to respond more effectively. The U.S. response is examined in terms of four models: coercive or regulatory federalism, nationalist cooperative federalism, non-centralized cooperative federalism, and dual federalism--finding that state-led dual federalism was the predominant response. The crisis also raised questions about interpretations of “federal inaction” because party divisions led some to regard the federal government’s response as inadequate while others viewed it as appropriate.
ISSN:0160-323X
1943-3409
DOI:10.1177/0160323X20986842