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We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance
The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignora...
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Published in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2021-04, Vol.198 (4), p.3565-3580 |
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description | The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y |
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subjects | Education Epistemology Ignorance KNOWING THE UNKNOWN Knowing the Unknown: Philosophical Perspectives on Ignorance Knowledge Logic Metaphysics Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Science Pragmatics Pragmatism Uncertainty |
title | We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance |
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