Ensuring US Dominance in Cyberspace in a World of Significant Peer and Near-Peer Competition

• Published in: Georgetown journal of international affairs 2018-10, Vol.19 (1), p.51-66
• Main Authors: Alexander, Keith B., Jaffer, Jamil N.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Army; Competition; Cybersecurity; Defense; Deterrence; Dominance; Electronic warfare; Hegemony; Infrastructure; Internet; Military operations; Nation states; National security; Non-state actors; Politics; Private sector; Safety & Security; Space warfare; Terrorism; Terrorist organizations; Threats
• ISSN: 1526-0054; 2471-8831; 2471-8831
• DOI: 10.1353/gia.2018.0007

In late 2015, China announced the creation of its Strategic Support Force (SSF) to unify the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities,1 an effort that parallels the creation of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009.2 Just like the United States, in recent years China has begun to describe cyberspace as a separate domain of warfare and strategic competition.3 Both China and the United States believe that their respective defense establishments should play a central role in protection of national assets from threats in cyberspace.4 According the US Department of Defense, the creation of the SSF likely represents China's "first step in developing a cyber force that creates efficiencies by combining cyber reconnaissance, attack, and defense capabilities into one organization. "9 Furthermore, USCYBERCOM explicitly differentiates its responsibility to "defend the nation" in cyberspace from its offensive capabilities and its support for active military operations.10 Similarly, Chinese military doctrine writers also differentiate between peacetime defensive operations and wartime military [End Page 51] support and offensive operations.11 At the same time, newer, evolving doctrine in both nations also recognizes that in the cyber domain—as well as in others—the current status quo represents more of a state of "continuous competition" rather than the traditional war-versus-peace paradigm12 and also understands the cyber battlespace as one where the lines between defense and offense are increasingly fluid.13 Given that one primary goal of the SSF is to accelerate the development of Chinese offensive and defensive cyber capabilities,14 and given the rise of a number of other peer and near-peer competitors in cyberspace,15 as well as the inherently asymmetric nature of cyber capabilities, a key question for the United States is how it can maintain the relative dominance it has enjoyed in this new domain of warfare going forward.16 The reality today is that America's relative hegemony in cyberspace as a domain of warfare is being (and will continue to be) contested in cyberspace. Today, the United States faces strategic threats in cyberspace from China as well as from Russia, two longtime key adversaries in this domain.17 The United States and its allies also face tactical threats from a range of actors including increasingly active nation-states like North Korea and Iran as well as a wide array of non-state actors, f