Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration

• Published in: Reliability engineering & system safety 2021-07, Vol.211, p.107617, Article 107617
• Main Authors: Zhang, Xiaoxiong, Ding, Song, Ge, Bingfeng, Xia, Boyuan, Pedrycz, Witold
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Expected utility; False targets; Game theory; Impact contest; Intelligence; Intelligence contest; Reliability engineering; Resource allocation; Security; Target recognition; Zero sum games
• ISSN: 0951-8320; 1879-0836
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2021.107617

•We study a sequential defender-attacker game;•Multiple strategies and targets are considered;•Learning and counter-learning behaviors are modeled;•The interaction between targets resulting in additional utility is allowed;•Comparative studies are implemented to see how parameters affect the equilibrium. Appropriate resource allocation among multiple targets plays a vital role in the defender-attacker game. Traditional methods seldom consider the optimal resource allocation with more than one strategy among multiple targets. Accordingly, we assume that the defender moves first, allocating resources in deploying different false targets and strengthening the genuine ones among multiple targets. The attacker moves after observing the defender's move, distributing resources in identifying false targets and then attacking the genuine ones concerning multiple targets. Each player aims to maximize their own overall expected utility given any of the other player's move. The optimal resource distribution between target intelligence/protection for the defender and target identification/attack efforts among multiple targets for the attacker is studied. We model and obtain analytical equilibrium results under various parameter settings. Our results show that increased intelligence (impact) contest intensities lead to lower (higher) attacker resources in intelligence (attack). Moreover, the zero-sum game where both players share the same preferences without additional payoff consideration results in the worst losses for the defender. The forgoing method offers an original way to approach the resource allocation problems in security defense fields.