Electoral Manipulation in Polarized Societies

I examine the relationship between democratic viability and polarization using a model of electoral manipulation and focusing on the strategic interaction between a policy-seeking incumbent and opposition. I find that polarization has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s use of electoral manipulat...

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Published in:The Journal of politics 2021-04, Vol.83 (2), p.483-497
Main Author: Horz, Carlo M.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ambiguity
Collective action
Courts
Elections
Manipulation
Polarization
Voter fraud
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description I examine the relationship between democratic viability and polarization using a model of electoral manipulation and focusing on the strategic interaction between a policy-seeking incumbent and opposition. I find that polarization has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s use of electoral manipulation. I apply the model to several concrete political processes and show that under these additional assumptions, the relationship between manipulation and polarization is inversely U-shaped: manipulation is low at low levels of polarization, peaks when polarization is intermediate, and decreases again as polarization becomes extreme. I show that this relationship is robust to several extensions. Finally, I investigate how the presence of a common democratic safeguard—a court—affects the relationship between polarization and manipulation. I find that the court constrains manipulation only if it is ideologically aligned with the opposition and polarization is low.
doi_str_mv 10.1086/709837
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source EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects Ambiguity
Collective action
Courts
Elections
Manipulation
Polarization
Voter fraud
title Electoral Manipulation in Polarized Societies
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