The effect of changing fiscal year-ends on audit fees and audit quality

• Published in: Journal of financial economic policy 2020-06, Vol.12 (3), p.365-382
• Main Authors: Pacheco Paredes, Angel Arturo, Wheatley, Clark
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Accounting firms; Audit fees; Audit quality; Auditing; Auditing profession; Auditors; Audits; Business cycles; Calendars; Companies; Cost control; Fees & charges; Fiscal years; Hypotheses; Seasons; Securities; Workloads
• ISSN: 1757-6385; 1757-6393
• DOI: 10.1108/JFEP-07-2019-0140

Purpose This study aims to extend recent research analyzing the effect of auditor busyness on audit quality. Specifically, this study explores the effect on audit quality of a change of fiscal year-end to or from an audit firm’s busy period. Design/methodology/approach Empirical archival. Findings When firms change their fiscal year-end to a period when the auditor is less busy, client firms are rewarded with lower audit fees and auditors are rewarded with a reduction in required effort. This study finds no difference in the level of audit quality after a change in fiscal year-end. Practical implications There are significant implications for audit firms as they may gain cost advantages by successfully promoting off-season fiscal year-ends, and reduce the negative effect on employees associated with “busy season” stress. Similarly, client firms may find that audit costs are reduced when they adopt a less “busy” fiscal year-end. Social implications These results have policy implications for regulators because regulators often dictate the fiscal year-end for certain industries or traded securities. Such dictates may thus introduce inefficiencies into the market for audit services. Originality/value These results should guide regulators in their decisions to dictate fiscal year-ends and firms in their choice of reporting periods.