Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control

Pollution control policies have achieved remarkable results in China. However, industrial firms still lack enthusiasm for technological innovation to reduce pollution and endogenous motivation for controlling pollution, which pose severe obstacles to industrial pollution control. The top-runner sche...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Environmental science and pollution research international 2021-06, Vol.28 (23), p.29344-29356
Main Authors: Chang, Dunhu, Gao, Donghui, Xu, Xiangbo, Wang, Xin, Ju, Ying, Shen, Xiaoyue
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aquatic Pollution
Atmospheric Protection/Air Quality Control/Air Pollution
Case studies
China
Earth and Environmental Science
Economic incentives
Ecotoxicology
Emissions control
Environment
Environmental Chemistry
Environmental Health
Environmental incentives
Environmental policy
Environmental Pollution - analysis
Environmental science
Industrial pollution
Industry
Inventions
Motivation
Policies
Pollution control
Quotas
Research Article
Taxation
Technological change
VAT
Waste Water Technology
Water Management
Water Pollution Control
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Pollution control policies have achieved remarkable results in China. However, industrial firms still lack enthusiasm for technological innovation to reduce pollution and endogenous motivation for controlling pollution, which pose severe obstacles to industrial pollution control. The top-runner scheme can stimulate the pollution control behaviors of firms to a certain extent. Therefore, the top-runner scheme is combined with economic incentive policies to design an appropriate incentive scheme in this paper, theoretical research is conducted on the selection standards and incentive methods, and four industries mainly responsible for pollution in a developed province of China are investigated as case studies. The results show that (1) the selection standard that stipulates the rewarded quotas instead of the discharge amount achieved higher emission reduction efficiency; (2) tax cuts are the best incentive for top-runners, and (3) the top-runner incentive scheme achieves a greater reduction effect in high-pollution industries than low-pollution industries. Value-added tax exemption for the top-runner, as determined by the rewarded quotas, contributes to increasing the enthusiasm from firms to participate in and improve pollution control measures.
ISSN:0944-1344
1614-7499
DOI:10.1007/s11356-021-12561-1