An evidentialist account of hinges

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is sometimes read as providing a response to the skeptical puzzle from closure, according to which our commitment to the trustworthiness of our evidence is not itself evidentially grounded. In this paper, I argue both that this standard reading ofWittgenstein is incorrect...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2021-07, Vol.198 (S15), p.S3577-S3591
Main Author: Neta, Ram
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Credibility
Education
Epistemology
Evidence
Hypotheses
Knowledge
Logic
Metaphysics
Monkeys & apes
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of Science
S.I.: SCEPTICISM AND EPISTEMIC ANGST
Skepticism
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
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Summary:Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is sometimes read as providing a response to the skeptical puzzle from closure, according to which our commitment to the trustworthiness of our evidence is not itself evidentially grounded. In this paper, I argue both that this standard reading ofWittgenstein is incorrect, and that a more accurate reading ofWittgenstein provides us with a more plausible solution to the Closure Puzzle.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-018-02061-0