Two-Sided Matching Meets Fair Division

We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to multiple agents on the other side over whom she has additive p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2021-07
Main Authors: Freeman, Rupert, Micha, Evi, Shah, Nisarg
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Matching
Reagents
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to multiple agents on the other side over whom she has additive preferences. We demand fairness for each side separately, giving rise to notions such as double envy-freeness up to one match (DEF1) and double maximin share guarantee (DMMS). We show that (a slight strengthening of) DEF1 cannot always be achieved, but in the special case where both sides have identical preferences, the round-robin algorithm with a carefully designed agent ordering achieves it. In contrast, DMMS cannot be achieved even when both sides have identical preferences.
ISSN:2331-8422