Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate Governance

We examine responses by Chinese firms to a party-building policy launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2015 to reform China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The policy requires SOEs to follow a model template of charter amendments to formalize and elevate the role of the CCP in their cor...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of legal studies 2021-01, Vol.50 (1), p.187-217
Main Authors: Lin, Lauren Yu-Hsin, Milhaupt, Curtis J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Amendments
Capital markets
Communism
Communist parties
Conformity
Contours
Corporate governance
Foreign investment
Governance
Market forces
Ownership
Political parties
Public enterprise
Reforms
Signaling
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Summary:We examine responses by Chinese firms to a party-building policy launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2015 to reform China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The policy requires SOEs to follow a model template of charter amendments to formalize and elevate the role of the CCP in their corporate governance. During the period 2015–18, about 10 percent of publicly traded SOEs failed to follow the mandatory policy, while nearly 6 percent of privately owned enterprises (POEs) complied even though they were not subject to the policy. We find wide variation in the provisions adopted within and across ownership types, with SOE adoptions apparently affected by their ownership structures and exposure to capital market forces and POE adoptions associated with political connections. Our findings highlight the complex contours of political conformity in Chinese firms and raise questions about the trajectory of Chinese corporate governance reform and foreign investment activity.
ISSN:0047-2530
1537-5366
DOI:10.1086/713189