Artificial moral and legal personhood

This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the Eur...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:AI & society 2021-06, Vol.36 (2), p.457-471
Main Author: Gordon, John-Stewart
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Artificial Intelligence
Autonomy
Civil law
Computer Science
Control
Engineering Economics
Ethical aspects
Legislation
Logistics
Marketing
Mechatronics
Methodology of the Social Sciences
Organization
Original Article
Performing Arts
Personhood
Political activity
Political aspects
Robotics
Robotics industry
Robots
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Summary:This paper considers the hotly debated issue of whether one should grant moral and legal personhood to intelligent robots once they have achieved a certain standard of sophistication based on such criteria as rationality, autonomy, and social relations. The starting point for the analysis is the European Parliament’s resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2017) and its recommendation that robots be granted legal status and electronic personhood. The resolution is discussed against the background of the so-called Robotics Open Letter, which is critical of the Civil Law Rules on Robotics (and particularly of §59 f.). The paper reviews issues related to the moral and legal status of intelligent robots and the notion of legal personhood, including an analysis of the relation between moral and legal personhood in general and with respect to robots in particular. It examines two analogies, to corporations (which are treated as legal persons) and animals, that have been proposed to elucidate the moral and legal status of robots. The paper concludes that one should not ascribe moral and legal personhood to currently existing robots, given their technological limitations, but that one should do so once they have achieved a certain level at which they would become comparable to human beings.
ISSN:0951-5666
1435-5655
DOI:10.1007/s00146-020-01063-2