Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literat...

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Published in:arXiv.org 2022-06
Main Authors: Arigapudi, Srinivas, Heller, Yuval, Schreiber, Amnon
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Asymmetry
Convergence
Equilibrium
Sampling
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Heller, Yuval
Schreiber, Amnon
description The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and an inefficient symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to playing one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that plausible sampling dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions by observing either opponents' behavior or payoffs in a few past interactions, can induce the opposite result: global convergence to one of the inefficient mixed stationary states.
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subjects Asymmetry
Convergence
Equilibrium
Sampling
title Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games
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