The causal theory of knowledge revisited: An interventionist approach

Goldman proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s's believing p. He later on abandoned this theory. The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ratio (Oxford) 2021-09, Vol.34 (3), p.193-202
Main Authors: Grefte, Job, Gebharter, Alexander
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
causal theory of knowledge
Causality
causation
epistemic luck
Epistemology
interventionism
knowledge
Theory
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Summary:Goldman proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s's believing p. He later on abandoned this theory. The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that the modified theory leads to the correct results in contexts involving other prominent forms of epistemic luck and compare it with other accounts on the market.
ISSN:0034-0006
1467-9329
DOI:10.1111/rati.12304