Purposiveness in nature: Hegel and Spinoza on anthropomorphism and backward causation

• Published in: Intellectual history review 2021-07, Vol.31 (3), p.463-478
• Main Author: Koch, Karen
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Anthropomorphism; backward causation; Causality; Hegel; nature; Spinoza; Teleology
• ISSN: 1749-6977; 1749-6985
• DOI: 10.1080/17496977.2021.1956043

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel's relation to Spinoza's account of teleology by discussing Spinoza and Hegel's stance to two straightforward objections against teleological views of reality: the anthropomorphism objection and the backward causation objection. I show that both argue against a teleological account that would be committed to the anthropomorphism objection by raising the same argument: such a divine intelligence would lack what it desires to realize. I then argue that their dealing with the backward causation objection differs. Whereas Spinoza finds the backward causation objection against natural purposiveness to be valid, Hegel uses this objection to build his own case: natural purposiveness obtains to a different aspect of reality than effective causality. In contrast, Spinoza defends the backward causation objection because he believes there is only one fundamental principle that reality is subject to. Not only has the issue of Spinoza and Hegel's relationship on teleology been neglected, I also argue that such a discussion can prove illuminating with respect to Hegel's stance to monism, as, in contrast to Spinoza, Hegel must assume that there are different fundamental principles governing reality and not merely one.