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Reputation and Advertising of Collective Brand Members in the Wine Industry: The Moderating Role of Market Share
This paper analyzes the nonlinear relationship between the advertising investment and reputation of collective brand members in an experience goods industry, as well as the moderating role of their market share within the collective brand. The central assumption is that the quality reputation of col...
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Published in: | Journal of wine economics 2021-05, Vol.16 (2), p.169-188 |
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container_title | Journal of wine economics |
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creator | Sellers-Rubio, Ricardo Mas-Ruiz, Francisco Sancho-Esper, Franco |
description | This paper analyzes the nonlinear relationship between the advertising investment and reputation of collective brand members in an experience goods industry, as well as the moderating role of their market share within the collective brand. The central assumption is that the quality reputation of collective brand members has a positive effect on their advertising investment until a reputation threshold is reached, after which the effect on advertising investment becomes negative. This change in the slope is explained by the information sets (firm reputation and collective reputation) used by consumers to reduce uncertainty, which leads to a weaker motivation for the firm to invest in advertising. In addition, scale economies of advertising mean that the market share of collective brand members negatively moderates the curvilinear relationship between quality reputation and advertising investment. The results for a sample of 176 companies in a Spanish experience goods industry (i.e., winemaking) between 2004 and 2014 show an inverted U-shaped relationship between the advertising investment and reputation of collective brand members. The results also show that market share negatively moderates this curvilinear relationship. (JEL Classifications: M31, M37, Q13) |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/jwe.2020.52 |
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subjects | Advertising Brand names Capital expenditures Consumers Economic analysis Game theory Market shares Markets Motivation Product quality Reputations |
title | Reputation and Advertising of Collective Brand Members in the Wine Industry: The Moderating Role of Market Share |
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