On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness

We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020) have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of social choice functions on strict preferences domains if the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2021-09, Vol.206, p.109992, Article 109992
Main Authors: Rao, K.P.S. Bhaskara, Basile, Achille, Rao, Surekha
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anonymity
Apathy
Nonlinear equations
Preference reversal
Preferences
Reversal
Social choice
Social choice function
Social networks
Strategy-proofness
Studies
Voters
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Summary:We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020) have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of social choice functions on strict preferences domains if the range has no more than three elements. We extend this result and, at the same time, present a simple argument for proving it. Our analysis points out the role of individual strategy-proofness in deriving the preference reversal property, giving back to the latter its original individual nature (cfr. Eliaz, 2004). Finally, we show that group strategy-proofness is needed to obtain preference reversal if there are infinitely many voters. •Almost preference reversal characterizes group strategy-proofness.•With three alternatives individual strategy-proofness implies preference reversal.•In infinite societies group strategy-proofness is needed to get preference reversal.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109992