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The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations
We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability o...
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Published in: | Journal of evolutionary economics 2021-09, Vol.31 (4), p.1277-1290 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large. |
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ISSN: | 1432-1386 0936-9937 1432-1386 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s00191-020-00719-y |