Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:arXiv.org 2024-08
Main Authors: Caspari, Gian, Khanna, Manshu
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Matching
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.
ISSN:2331-8422