On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare

We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of theoretical politics 2021-10, Vol.33 (4), p.430-454
Main Authors: Fox, Justin, Polborn, Mattias
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cooperation
Freedoms
Independence
Legislatures
Political institutions
Presidential powers
Separation of powers
Social welfare
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Summary:We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.
ISSN:0951-6298
1460-3667
DOI:10.1177/09516298211043234