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Inclusive conflict? Competitive clientelism and the rise of political violence

Conflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and viole...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Review of international studies 2022-01, Vol.48 (1), p.44-66
Main Authors: Raleigh, Clionadh, Choi, Hyun Jin, Wigmore-Shepherd, Daniel
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Conflict across African states has often been linked to ethnic-based biases in government, and exclusive policies. However, the domestic politics of developing states, and the elites who contest for power therein, have often been overlooked when explaining the patterns and risk of disorder and violence. We consider how African leaders practice politics in whom to represent, and at what level. These choices have consequences as how regimes accommodate political elites creates different competitive conditions which, in turn, create incentives and opportunities for political violence. Using a dataset on cabinet appointments over twenty years, we find that high levels of elite political inclusion and mal-apportionment in positions is consistently associated with increases in non-state violence. Power distribution levels among those groups included in senior positions account for more political violence than that which stems from exclusive politics.
ISSN:0260-2105
1469-9044
DOI:10.1017/S0260210521000218