Political Realism and Epistemic Constraints

This article argues that Bernard Williams’ Critical Theory Principle (CTP) is in tension with his realist commitments, i.e., deriving political norms from practices that are inherent to political life. The Williamsian theory of legitimate state power is based on the central importance of the distinc...

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Published in:Social theory and practice 2022, Vol.48 (1), p.1-27
Main Author: Aytac, Ugur
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Acceptability
Coercion
Critical theory
Dominance
Epistemology
Justification
Politics
Power
State power
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description This article argues that Bernard Williams’ Critical Theory Principle (CTP) is in tension with his realist commitments, i.e., deriving political norms from practices that are inherent to political life. The Williamsian theory of legitimate state power is based on the central importance of the distinction between political rule and domination. Further, Williams supplements the normative force of his theory with the CTP, i.e., the principle that acceptance of a justification regarding power relations ought not to be created by the very same coercive power. I contend that the CTP is an epistemic criterion of reflective (un)acceptability which is not strictly connected to the question of whether people are dominated or not. I show that there are cases of non-domination that fail the epistemic requirements of the CTP.
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Sociological Abstracts
subjects Acceptability
Coercion
Critical theory
Dominance
Epistemology
Justification
Politics
Power
State power
title Political Realism and Epistemic Constraints
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