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A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated...

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Published in:Sustainability 2022-02, Vol.14 (3), p.1926
Main Authors: Huang, Qiyun, Wang, Junwu, Ye, Mengwei, Zhao, Shiman, Si, Xiang
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Language:English
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container_title Sustainability
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creator Huang, Qiyun
Wang, Junwu
Ye, Mengwei
Zhao, Shiman
Si, Xiang
description With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings.
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subjects Building construction
Buildings
Construction
Construction industry
Consumers
Cooperation
Cost control
Emissions
Energy consumption
Environmental impact
Environmental management
Game theory
Industrial development
Manufacturers
Market economies
Prefabricated buildings
Real estate
Residential areas
Residential buildings
Residential development
Supply chain management
Sustainable development
title A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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