Loading…
A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated...
Saved in:
Published in: | Sustainability 2022-02, Vol.14 (3), p.1926 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
cited_by | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3 |
---|---|
cites | cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3 |
container_end_page | |
container_issue | 3 |
container_start_page | 1926 |
container_title | Sustainability |
container_volume | 14 |
creator | Huang, Qiyun Wang, Junwu Ye, Mengwei Zhao, Shiman Si, Xiang |
description | With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings. |
doi_str_mv | 10.3390/su14031926 |
format | article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2627846467</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2627846467</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpNkMtKAzEUhoMoWLQbnyDgThjNrcnMsi21FgoWreshnSQ2ZZrUJFPoztfw9XwSUyro2ZzD-T_-cwHgBqN7Siv0EDvMEMUV4WegR5DABUYDdP6vvgT9GDcoB80c5j0QhvA1deoAvYNpreHMNdolu9dw4Vvb5L6B47V18vvzK8JF0Eaugm1k0gq-6GjVkZYtHHW2Vda9RziSMWvZbrL3bZesdzIc4FRuNVyutQ-Ha3BhZBt1_zdfgbfHyXL8VMyfp7PxcF40pBqkQnJGBqLkGhuBjFBipQhSZYWx0qzRqlKlIsJILEq6wiQrTGBDcFMxyShV9Arcnnx3wX90OqZ647vg8siacCJKxhkXmbo7UU3wMeb76l2w27xyjVF9fGv991b6A1Psawc</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2627846467</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory</title><source>Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</source><creator>Huang, Qiyun ; Wang, Junwu ; Ye, Mengwei ; Zhao, Shiman ; Si, Xiang</creator><creatorcontrib>Huang, Qiyun ; Wang, Junwu ; Ye, Mengwei ; Zhao, Shiman ; Si, Xiang</creatorcontrib><description>With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings.</description><identifier>ISSN: 2071-1050</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2071-1050</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.3390/su14031926</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Basel: MDPI AG</publisher><subject>Building construction ; Buildings ; Construction ; Construction industry ; Consumers ; Cooperation ; Cost control ; Emissions ; Energy consumption ; Environmental impact ; Environmental management ; Game theory ; Industrial development ; Manufacturers ; Market economies ; Prefabricated buildings ; Real estate ; Residential areas ; Residential buildings ; Residential development ; Supply chain management ; Sustainable development</subject><ispartof>Sustainability, 2022-02, Vol.14 (3), p.1926</ispartof><rights>2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-5119-8374 ; 0000-0001-8300-3992 ; 0000-0002-3245-2031</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2627846467/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/2627846467?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,25753,27924,27925,37012,44590,75126</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Huang, Qiyun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Junwu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ye, Mengwei</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Shiman</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Si, Xiang</creatorcontrib><title>A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory</title><title>Sustainability</title><description>With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings.</description><subject>Building construction</subject><subject>Buildings</subject><subject>Construction</subject><subject>Construction industry</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Cost control</subject><subject>Emissions</subject><subject>Energy consumption</subject><subject>Environmental impact</subject><subject>Environmental management</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Industrial development</subject><subject>Manufacturers</subject><subject>Market economies</subject><subject>Prefabricated buildings</subject><subject>Real estate</subject><subject>Residential areas</subject><subject>Residential buildings</subject><subject>Residential development</subject><subject>Supply chain management</subject><subject>Sustainable development</subject><issn>2071-1050</issn><issn>2071-1050</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>PIMPY</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkMtKAzEUhoMoWLQbnyDgThjNrcnMsi21FgoWreshnSQ2ZZrUJFPoztfw9XwSUyro2ZzD-T_-cwHgBqN7Siv0EDvMEMUV4WegR5DABUYDdP6vvgT9GDcoB80c5j0QhvA1deoAvYNpreHMNdolu9dw4Vvb5L6B47V18vvzK8JF0Eaugm1k0gq-6GjVkZYtHHW2Vda9RziSMWvZbrL3bZesdzIc4FRuNVyutQ-Ha3BhZBt1_zdfgbfHyXL8VMyfp7PxcF40pBqkQnJGBqLkGhuBjFBipQhSZYWx0qzRqlKlIsJILEq6wiQrTGBDcFMxyShV9Arcnnx3wX90OqZ647vg8siacCJKxhkXmbo7UU3wMeb76l2w27xyjVF9fGv991b6A1Psawc</recordid><startdate>20220201</startdate><enddate>20220201</enddate><creator>Huang, Qiyun</creator><creator>Wang, Junwu</creator><creator>Ye, Mengwei</creator><creator>Zhao, Shiman</creator><creator>Si, Xiang</creator><general>MDPI AG</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4U-</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5119-8374</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8300-3992</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3245-2031</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20220201</creationdate><title>A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory</title><author>Huang, Qiyun ; Wang, Junwu ; Ye, Mengwei ; Zhao, Shiman ; Si, Xiang</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Building construction</topic><topic>Buildings</topic><topic>Construction</topic><topic>Construction industry</topic><topic>Consumers</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Cost control</topic><topic>Emissions</topic><topic>Energy consumption</topic><topic>Environmental impact</topic><topic>Environmental management</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Industrial development</topic><topic>Manufacturers</topic><topic>Market economies</topic><topic>Prefabricated buildings</topic><topic>Real estate</topic><topic>Residential areas</topic><topic>Residential buildings</topic><topic>Residential development</topic><topic>Supply chain management</topic><topic>Sustainable development</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Huang, Qiyun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Junwu</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ye, Mengwei</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Shiman</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Si, Xiang</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>University Readers</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><jtitle>Sustainability</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Huang, Qiyun</au><au>Wang, Junwu</au><au>Ye, Mengwei</au><au>Zhao, Shiman</au><au>Si, Xiang</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory</atitle><jtitle>Sustainability</jtitle><date>2022-02-01</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>14</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>1926</spage><pages>1926-</pages><issn>2071-1050</issn><eissn>2071-1050</eissn><abstract>With prefabricated construction method deemed as an effective way to improve the environmental performance and sustainable development of the building industry, it is inevitably adopted in the scaled residence in the process of residential industrialization. However, the development of prefabricated residential buildings is still immature under the current market economy system, because the stakeholders involved in the process are not yet able to form a good cooperation mechanism and they are more inclined to keep their own interests. As a result, the market share of prefabricated residential buildings is relatively low. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on the stakeholders involved. By analyzing their costs and benefits, the reasons that really impede the population of prefabricated residential buildings can be found. In this paper, incremental cost allocation coefficient is introduced, the incremental cost difference under different assembly rates is considered, and the allocation ratio of the incremental cost input of the prefabricated building is analyzed based on game theory. The evolutionary game theory for government and real estate companies is established under the condition of bounded rationality with consumer participation. Then the effectiveness of the game theory is verified using empirical analysis, so as to provide reference for the authorities to promote the large-scale development of prefabricated residential buildings.</abstract><cop>Basel</cop><pub>MDPI AG</pub><doi>10.3390/su14031926</doi><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5119-8374</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8300-3992</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3245-2031</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 2071-1050 |
ispartof | Sustainability, 2022-02, Vol.14 (3), p.1926 |
issn | 2071-1050 2071-1050 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2627846467 |
source | Publicly Available Content Database (Proquest) (PQ_SDU_P3) |
subjects | Building construction Buildings Construction Construction industry Consumers Cooperation Cost control Emissions Energy consumption Environmental impact Environmental management Game theory Industrial development Manufacturers Market economies Prefabricated buildings Real estate Residential areas Residential buildings Residential development Supply chain management Sustainable development |
title | A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory |
url | http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-02T03%3A56%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Study%20on%20the%20Incentive%20Policy%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Prefabricated%20Residential%20Buildings%20Based%20on%20Evolutionary%20Game%20Theory&rft.jtitle=Sustainability&rft.au=Huang,%20Qiyun&rft.date=2022-02-01&rft.volume=14&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=1926&rft.pages=1926-&rft.issn=2071-1050&rft.eissn=2071-1050&rft_id=info:doi/10.3390/su14031926&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2627846467%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c295t-a6425786e1f70f7d7bd20d8911de4ced9d8d27fa1783b12d89471f21c94a433d3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2627846467&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |