Capacitism and the transparency of evidence

Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mind & language 2022-04, Vol.37 (2), p.219-226
Main Author: Neta, Ram
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
disjunctivism
evidence
Evidentiality
hallucination
Hallucinations
perception
Perceptions
Phenomenology
Schellenberg
Transparency
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Summary:Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us.
ISSN:0268-1064
1468-0017
DOI:10.1111/mila.12325