Coalitions with limited coordination

We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be defined in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the different ma...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2022-04, Vol.73 (2-3), p.439-456
Main Author: Koutsougeras, Leonidas C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetric information
Coalitions
Commodities
Cooperation
Coordination
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Enforcement
Equilibrium
Game Theory
Games
Market structure
Microeconomics
Public Finance
Research Article
Social and Behav. Sciences
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Summary:We study economies endowed with a market structure, where coalitions can form within each market but have no enforcement possibilities across markets. A standard cooperative game cannot be defined in this case. We develop a certain equilibrium notion which ties together the cores of the different markets. We provide an existence result and an application to economies with asymmetric information.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z