Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strat...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social choice and welfare 2022-05, Vol.58 (4), p.711-740
Main Authors: Bolle, Friedel, Otto, Philipp E
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Ballots
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Emotional responses
Equilibrium
Game Theory
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
International Political Economy
Original Paper
Public Finance
Roll call
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Strategic voting
Voter behavior
Voters
Voting
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Summary:When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental results, however, show severe deviations from the equilibrium strategy in sequential voting with not significantly more true majority results than in simultaneous voting. Social considerations under sequential voting—based on emotional reactions toward the behaviors of the previous players—seem to distort subgame perfect equilibria.
ISSN:1432-217X
0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6