Impact of Bayesian Learning and Externalities on Strategic Investment

We investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns. We examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which (i) a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the f...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Management science 2016-02, Vol.62 (2), p.550-570
Main Authors: Kwon, H. Dharma, Xu, Wenxin, Agrawal, Anupam, Muthulingam, Suresh
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Attrition
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian statistical decision theory
Capital investments
Corporate finance
decision analysis
Duopoly
dynamic programming
Externalities (Economics)
Externality
Game theory
games
group decisions
Investment policy
Investments
Learning
Management
Methods
optimal control
Profitability
Return on investment
sequential
stochastic
Uncertainty
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Summary:We investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns. We examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which (i) a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and (ii) externalities exist between the investments of two firms. We find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs. In particular, we find that, contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move, an increase in the rate of learning—which tends to benefit the follower—can hasten the first investment. This paper was accepted by James Smith, decision analysis.
ISSN:0025-1909
1526-5501
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2156