Is Skill a Kind of Disposition to Action-Guiding Knowledge?

• Published in: Erkenntnis 2022-08, Vol.87 (4), p.1907-1930
• Main Authors: Khalaj, M. Hosein M. A., Shirazi, S. M. Hassan A.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Cognition & reasoning; Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Intellectualism; Knowledge; Logic; Ontology; Original Research; Philosophy
• ISSN: 0165-0106; 1572-8420
• DOI: 10.1007/s10670-020-00283-8

Developing an intellectualist account of skill, Stanley and Williamson define skill as a kind of disposition to action-guiding knowledge. The present paper challenges their definition of skill. While we don’t dispute that skill may consist of a cognitive, a dispositional, and an action-guiding component, we argue that Stanley and Williamson’s account of each component is problematic. In the first section, we argue, against Stanley and Williamson, that the cognitive component of skill is not a case of propositional knowledge-wh, which is typically indexical. In the second section, we seek to show that Stanley and Williamson face difficulties in arguing for a generic claim about skill as a kind of disposition, and they fail to defend intellectualism about skill based on the dispositional account. In the third section we argue that Stanley and Williamson need a more detailed account of the action-guiding aspect of skill to avoid several difficulties, including a threat of a regress. We close with some lessons for the debate over intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about skill.