Entitlement, generosity, relativism, and structure‐internal goods

Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non‐evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Metaphilosophy 2022-07, Vol.53 (4), p.486-511
Main Author: Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
coherence
Crispin Wright
epistemic entitlement
epistemic relativism
epistemic value
justification
non‐evidential warrant
skepticism
transmission of warrant failure
warrant
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Summary:Crispin Wright is widely known for having introduced epistemic entitlement, a species of non‐evidential warrant, as a response to certain skeptical challenges. This paper investigates a fundamental issue concerning entitlement: it appears to be quite generous, as it appears to apply indiscriminately to anti‐skepticial hypotheses as well as a range of radically different—indeed, even incompatible—propositions. It argues that the generosity of entitlement is reflective of an underlying commitment to a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, the paper presents an axiology that helps entitlement theorists to address the pressing issue of how, given the absence of evidence, there can be anything epistemically good about acceptance of anti‐skeptical hypotheses and other cornerstones for inquiry. Lastly, the paper argues that the issues of generosity and epistemic relativism are rather deeply rooted: they surface at the level of value. It explains why.
ISSN:0026-1068
1467-9973
DOI:10.1111/meta.12557