Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions

We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral los...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Comparative politics 2022-07, Vol.54 (4), p.595-619
Main Authors: Gjerløw, Haakon, Rasmussen, Magnus B.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bolshevism
Data
Democratization
Electoral reform
Electoral Rules
Incumbency
Parliamentary systems
Proportional Representation
Public relations
Radicalism
Revolution
Socialism
Threats
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Summary:We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Incumbents came to over-estimate the true revolutionary threat in Europe. Simultaneously, reformist parliamentarian socialists came to push for PR to weaken the radicals within their party. Incumbents and reformist socialists could therefore support the same system. We test this using qualitative and quantitative data from Norway’s adoption of PR in 1919.
ISSN:0010-4159
2151-6227
DOI:10.5129/001041522X16316387001621