For One Can Always Start Something New: An Arendtian-Psychoanalytic Reflection on Patient Agency

• Published in: Psychoanalytic psychology 2022-10, Vol.39 (4), p.295-301
• Main Authors: Acke, Emma, Meganck, Reitske
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Agency; Alienation; Etymology; Guilt; History; Human; Oral Communication; Psychoanalysis; Psychoanalytic Theory; Psychotherapy; Responsibility
• ISSN: 0736-9735; 1939-1331
• DOI: 10.1037/pap0000412

In this study, we explore the etymology and history of "agency," link it with relational psychoanalytic literature, and examine how it can be understood within Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and practice. Building on its history, we find that "agency" embodies a binary distinction between the person as an actor, on the one hand, and as a being who is subject to determining structures, on the other. This binary approach, however, limits the debate concerning agency. Arendt's concept of "action," which builds on the same etymological stem as "agency" (i.e., "agere"), allows for nuance in the concept and moves it beyond its otherwise binary understanding. Through this conceptual work, we draw three conclusions regarding patient agency: (a) agency can only come about in relation to others; (b) initiating a new beginning in speech acts and actions already implies agency; and (c) one must be willing to take responsibility for the consequences of one's actions to be able to feel agentic. Lastly, we relate these three conclusions to Lacanian psychoanalysis, in particular to the notions of alienation and separation, full speech, and guilt. 在这项研究中,我们探讨了"动因"的词源和历史,将其与关系学派精神分析的文献联系起来,并研究了如何在拉康精神分析理论和实践中理解它。基于它的历史,我们发现"动因"体现了作为行动者的人与作为受制于决定性结构的存在之间的二元区别。然而,这种二元方法限制了关于动因的辩论。阿伦特的"行动"概念,建立在与"动因"(即"agere")相同的词源词干之上,使概念中的细微差别成为可能,并将其超越其二元理解。通过这个概念性的工作,我们得出了关于患者动因的三个结论:(1)动因只能与他人相关;(2)在言语行为和行动中发起新的开端已必然包含着动因;(3)一个人必须愿意对自己的行为的后果负责,以便能够感到能动性。最后,我们将这三个结论与拉康精神分析联系起来,特别是对于异化和分离,充分言说以及内疚的概念。