Some Remarks on the Apparent Absence of a priori Reasoning in Indian Philosophy

This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Ev...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Indian philosophy 2022-11, Vol.50 (5), p.785-801
Main Author: Taber, John
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Empiricism
Epistemology
Hypotheses
Knowledge
Meditation
Nature
Non-Western Philosophy
Philosophy
Philosophy of Religion
Rationalism
Religious Studies
Senses
Sensory perception
Yoga
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Summary:This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika , Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila’s view is contrasted to Plato’s, in the Theaetetus , that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul ( psychē ).
ISSN:0022-1791
1573-0395
DOI:10.1007/s10781-022-09523-3