Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

We study probabilistic voting rules in the case where agents have single-peaked preferences over alternatives. A probabilistic rule decides a probability distribution over the set of alternatives for each profile of agents’ preferences. In this paper, we characterize the class of group strategy-proo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of mathematical economics 2022-10, Vol.102, p.102755, Article 102755
Main Author: Morimoto, Shuhei
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Group strategy-proofness
Mathematics
Preferences
Probabilistic rule
Probability
Probability distribution
Single-peaked preferences
Statistical analysis
Voting
Voting rules
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Description
Summary:We study probabilistic voting rules in the case where agents have single-peaked preferences over alternatives. A probabilistic rule decides a probability distribution over the set of alternatives for each profile of agents’ preferences. In this paper, we characterize the class of group strategy-proof and peak-only probabilistic rules.
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102755