Contribution games with asymmetric agents

We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of mathematical economics 2022-10, Vol.102, p.102724, Article 102724
Main Author: Yu, Zhixian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetry
Contribution games
Deadline effect
Equilibrium
Game theory
Games
Players
Reward distribution
Rewards
Value effect
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Summary:We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.
ISSN:0304-4068
1873-1538
DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102724