Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity . Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists w...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2023, Vol.194 (1-2), p.27-44
Main Authors: Bergantiños, Gustavo, Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anonymity
Audiences
Broadcasting
Decentralization
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Political Science
Professional soccer
Public Finance
Revenue sharing
Sports
Sports clubs
Taxes
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Summary:We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity . Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals ), majority equilibrium does exist.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-022-01015-y