Congress's Anti-Removal Power

Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymak...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Vanderbilt law review 2023-01, Vol.76 (1), p.1-81
Main Authors: Nielson, Aaron L, Walker, Christopher J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Comptrollers
Constitutional law
Executive departments
Executive power
Laws, regulations and rules
Nominations
Political aspects
Politics
Presidents
Privileges and immunities
Restrictions
Supreme Court decisions
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Summary:Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymaking within the executive branch. Recognizing that a supermajority of the Justices now appears to reject or at least limit the principle from Humphrey's Executor that Congress may prevent the President from removing agency officials based on policy disagreement, scholars increasingly predict that the Court will soon further weaken agency independence if not jettison it altogether.
ISSN:0042-2533
1942-9886