Rebel institutions and negotiated peace

Civil wars are difficult to resolve through negotiated settlements. Rebel institutions are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show, however, that this positive association does not hold. Rather, rebel service provision is negatively correlated with successful negotiated settlements. The...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Conflict management and peace science 2023-05, Vol.40 (3), p.239-259
Main Author: Albert, Karen
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Civil war
Institutions
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Summary:Civil wars are difficult to resolve through negotiated settlements. Rebel institutions are thought to make negotiations more successful. I show, however, that this positive association does not hold. Rather, rebel service provision is negatively correlated with successful negotiated settlements. The well-established literature on commitment problems suggests that negotiated settlements are not reached because governments end negotiations amidst fears of rebel growth from civilian support derived from service provision. I offer an alternative explanation—strategic stalling—based on rebel incentives to realize the full long-term benefits of service provision. Qualitative evidence shows that observable implications of strategic stalling are observed in the cases surveyed.
ISSN:0738-8942
1549-9219
DOI:10.1177/07388942221147508