Policy Influence of Delegates in Authoritarian Legislatures: Evidence from China

Can delegates in authoritarian legislatures influence policy outcomes? The existing literature provides extensive knowledge on how delegates behave but relatively little evidence on how government processes delegate policy participation and whether such participation changes policy. Based on a uniqu...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political research quarterly 2023-06, Vol.76 (2), p.481-495
Main Author: Liu, Dongshu
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Acceptance
Authoritarianism
Autocracy
Delegates
Government
Legislatures
Participation
Policy making
Public goods
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Can delegates in authoritarian legislatures influence policy outcomes? The existing literature provides extensive knowledge on how delegates behave but relatively little evidence on how government processes delegate policy participation and whether such participation changes policy. Based on a unique dataset of government responses to delegates’ policy proposals in China, this paper proposes a new distributive theory of authoritarian legislature and explains the conditions under which delegates can influence policy. The findings show that proposals requesting particularistic benefits are more likely to receive acceptance when they are made by delegates representing regime allies, whereas proposals requesting universalistic benefits are more likely to attain acceptance if they come from delegates representing the public. This finding can shed new light on authoritarian legislatures and their influence on policy. It also reveals a new theory of how autocrats make tradeoffs in allocating resources to accommodate competing policy demands and provide public goods.
ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/10659129221101390