Direct Election, Bureaucratic Appointment and Local Government Responsiveness in Taiwan

Does local democracy induce better service to citizens? While elected officials can be punished at the ballot box if they fail to address citizens’ needs, appointed bureaucrats may have policy knowledge that enables them to better serve citizens. Employing a multimethod design, this paper uses varia...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The China quarterly (London) 2023-06, Vol.254, p.494-504
Main Author: Newland, Sara A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bureaucracy
Cities
Citizens
Democracy
Election results
Elections
Electronic mail systems
Local elections
Local government
Political appointments
Political institutions
Politics
Public officials
Research Report
Response rates
Responsiveness
Voters
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Summary:Does local democracy induce better service to citizens? While elected officials can be punished at the ballot box if they fail to address citizens’ needs, appointed bureaucrats may have policy knowledge that enables them to better serve citizens. Employing a multimethod design, this paper uses variation in local political institutions in Taiwan to assess the relative merits of direct election and bureaucratic appointment for local government responsiveness. While democratic institutions are often thought to induce responsiveness, I find that in Taiwan, with its historically strong bureaucracy and relatively new democratic institutions, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Elected and appointed officials face different incentives that motivate the latter to respond more quickly and effectively to online requests for help.
ISSN:0305-7410
1468-2648
DOI:10.1017/S0305741023000012