Carbon Offsetting-Driven Multi-Actor Low-Carbon Collaborative Evolutionary Game Analysis

The proactive strategic choice for low-carbon collaboration among various sectors of society is to promote low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain through carbon offsetting. This study delves into the strategy selection and game process of carbon offset actions with participation from busi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Sustainability 2023-06, Vol.15 (12), p.9167
Main Authors: Zhou, Ziao, Li, Yuan, Zhang, Yongli
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Carbon offsets
Carbon rationing
Clean technology
Climate change
Collaboration
Compensation
Consumers
Ecological footprint
Economic development
Emissions trading
Environmental protection
Environmental tax
Evolution
Fisheries
Game theory
International trade
Kao Tsu, Emperor of China
Kyoto Protocol
Literature reviews
Manufacturers
Manufacturing
Parameter sensitivity
Participation
Political aspects
Public participation
Punishment
Sensitivity analysis
Stakeholders
Strategic planning
Strategy
Subsidies
Sustainability
Willingness to pay
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Summary:The proactive strategic choice for low-carbon collaboration among various sectors of society is to promote low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain through carbon offsetting. This study delves into the strategy selection and game process of carbon offset actions with participation from businesses, government, and public, thus revealing the dynamic evolutionary relationship of the behavior of each stakeholder. A multi-agent low-carbon collaboration evolutionary game model is established, driven by carbon compensation. The game process undergoes an evolutionary trend simulation, strategy evolution analysis, and key parameter sensitivity analysis, ultimately identifying the optimal cooperative mode and key influencing factors among various stakeholders. The study found that an evolutionary equilibrium and stable strategy exists in the game process of enterprise, government, and public participation in carbon offsetting. The initial participation willingness of each stakeholder has an impact on the strategy choices of other stakeholders. Behaviors such as leading by example, punishment for violators, reasonable subsidy intensity, and active public supervision have a positive effect in promoting carbon offsetting policies and low-carbon collaboration. The research findings offer theoretical insights into promoting efficient multi-party green cooperation and accomplishing low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain under the ‘dual-carbon’ goal.
ISSN:2071-1050
2071-1050
DOI:10.3390/su15129167