Beyond deterrence: Uncertain stability in the nuclear era

This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Conflict management and peace science 2023-11, Vol.40 (6), p.655-674
Main Authors: Kang, Kyungkook, Kugler, Jacek
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Deterrence
Modernization
Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapons
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Summary:This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities.
ISSN:0738-8942
1549-9219
DOI:10.1177/07388942221149670