Medication error during nonoperating room anesthesia—a case report

Despite a lot has already been done in the field of safety improvement during anesthesia, medication errors still occur during everyday practice. Syringe or ampule swaps are usually the most frequent type of medication error. Recent studies prove that nearly 80% of these errors are preventable. In o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of patient safety and risk management 2023-12, Vol.28 (6), p.286-293
Main Authors: Kostadinov, Ivan, Stecher, Adela, Novak-Jankovic, Vesna, Poredos, Peter
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Anesthesia
Avoidable
Cheese
Color
Critical incidents
Dopamine
Drugs
Educational programs
Environmental aspects
Health education
Health promotion
Hypertension
Medical errors
Midazolam
Restlessness
Safety measures
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Summary:Despite a lot has already been done in the field of safety improvement during anesthesia, medication errors still occur during everyday practice. Syringe or ampule swaps are usually the most frequent type of medication error. Recent studies prove that nearly 80% of these errors are preventable. In our case, 30 mg (3 ml) of dopamine (Dopamin Fresenius 10 mg/ml) was injected to the patient’s intravenous line instead of 3 mg (3 ml) midazolam (Midazolam Accord 1 mg/ml) during the preparation for the carotid artery stenting procedure in nonoperating room environment. The error was realized immediately after the application. Besides temporary fulminant hypertensive reaction, tachycardia, restlessness, skin rush, troponin leak, and temporary ST-segment depression, there were no permanent consequences to the patient's health. The team was able to perform the planned procedure 30 min after the event. This medication error of ampule swap, packages of which were stored in the medication cupboard one above the other, was caused by alignment of the latent vulnerable layers of the safety system (Swiss Cheese Model of System Error and Hot Cheese Model) plus the influence of the environmental factors and active failures done by the anesthesia staff. After this event, new safety measures were established by introducing color-coded ISO 26825:2020 syringe labeling, new anesthesia trolleys with color-coded medication compartments, and color-coded medication storage cupboards. Besides this safety committee was formed for the promotion of medication safety education programs.
ISSN:2516-0435
2516-0443
DOI:10.1177/25160435231185042