Toward a theory of minority-party influence in the U.S. Congress: whip counts, amendment votes, and minority leverage in the house

• Published in: Journal of public policy 2023-12, Vol.43 (4), p.722-740
• Main Authors: Jenkins, Jeffery A., Monroe, Nathan W., Provins, Tessa
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Amendments; Cartels; Decision making; Disappointment; Filibusters; Legislative process; Leverage; Political leadership; Political majority; Voting
• ISSN: 0143-814X; 1469-7815
• DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X2300020X

The literature on congressional decision-making has largely ignored the influence of the minority party in the legislative process. This follows from the widely held belief that the majority party dominates the agenda-setting process. Though the minority party rarely achieves major policy success in Congress, we argue that the minority has significantly more influence over the legislative agenda than is commonly believed. We posit that, under some conditions, the minority has enough bargaining leverage to get floor votes on their proposals, in the form of both amendments and bills. We test our theoretical expectations with a novel design utilizing whip count data from the House and show that when a whip count on a bill occurs, the likelihood of a minority amendment disappointment and a majority amendment roll increases, respectively. This suggests that the more leverage the minority party has, the more we see their legislative proposals on the floor.